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Recently, we introduced in [1] a model for product adoption in social networks with multiple prod-
ucts, where the agents, influenced by their neighbours, can adopt one out of several alternatives
(products). To analyze these networks we introduce social network games in which product adoption
is obligatory.
We show that when the underlying graph is a simple cycle, there is a polynomial time algorithm
allowing us to determine whether the game has a Nash equilibrium. In contrast, in the arbitrary case
this problem is NP-complete. We also show that the problem of determining whether the game is
weakly acyclic is co-NP hard.
Using these games we analyze various types of paradoxes that can arise in the considered net-
works. One of them corresponds to the well-known Braess paradox in congestion games. In partic-
ular, we show that social networks exist with the property that by adding an additional product to
a specific node, the choices of the nodes will unavoidably evolve in such a way that everybody is
strictly worse off.
1 Introduction
Social networks became a huge interdisciplinary research area with important links to sociology, eco-
nomics, epidemiology, computer science, and mathematics. A flurry of numerous articles, notably the
influential [11], and books, e.g., [7, 3], helped to delineate better this area. It deals with many diverse
topics such as epidemics, spread of certain patterns of social behaviour, effects of advertising, and emer-
gence of ‘bubbles’ in financial markets.
Recently, we introduced in [1] social networks with multiple products, in which the agents (players),
influenced by their neighbours, can adopt one out of several alternatives (products). To study the situa-
tion when the product adoption is obligatory we introduce here social network games in which product
adoption is obligatory. An example of a studied situation is when a group of people chooses an obliga-
tory ‘product’, for instance, an operating system or a mobile phone provider, by taking into account the
choice of their friends. The resulting games exhibit the following join the crowd property:
the payoff of each player weakly increases when more players choose his strategy.
that we define more precisely in Subsection 2.3.
The considered games are a modification of the strategic games that we recently introduced in [14]
and more fully in [15], in which the product adoption was optional. The insistence on product selection
leads to a different analysis and different results than the ones reported there. In particular, Nash equilib-
ria need not exist already in the case when the underlying graph is a simple cycle. We show that one can
determine in polynomial time whether for such social networks a Nash equilibrium exists. We prove that
for arbitrary networks, determining whether a Nash equilibrium exists is NP-complete. We also show
that for arbitrary networks and for networks whose underlying graph has no source nodes, determining
whether the game is weakly acyclic is co-NP hard.
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The considered social networks allow us to analyze various paradoxes that were identified in the
literature. One example is the paradox of choice first formulated in [13]. It has been summarised in [6,
page 38] as follows:
The more options one has, the more possibilities for experiencing conflict arise, and the
more difficult it becomes to compare the options. There is a point where more options,
products, and choices hurt both seller and consumer.
The point is that consumers choices depend on their friends’ and acquaintances’ preferences.
Another example is a ‘bubble’ in a financial market, where a decision of a trader to switch to some
new financial product triggers a sequence of transactions, as a result of which all traders involved become
worse off.
Such paradoxes are similar to the renowned Braess paradox which states that in some road networks
the travel time can actually increase when new roads are added, see, e.g., [12, pages 464-465] and a
‘dual’ version of Braess paradox that concerns the removal of road segments, studied in [4, 5]. Both
paradoxes were studied by means of congestion games. However, in contrast to congestion games, Nash
equilibria do not need to exist in the games we consider here. Consequently, one needs to rely on different
arguments. Moreover, there are now two new types of paradoxes that correspond to the situations when
an addition, respectively, removal, of a product can lead to a game with no Nash equilibrium.
For each of these four cases we present a social network that exhibits the corresponding paradox.
These paradoxes were identified first in [2] in the case when the adoption of a product was not obligatory.
In contrast to the case here considered the existence of a strongest paradox within the framework of [2]
remains an open problem.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Strategic games
A strategic game for n > 1 players, written as (S1, . . . ,Sn, p1, . . . , pn), consists of a non-empty set Si of
strategies and a payoff function pi : S1×·· ·×Sn→R, for each player i.
Fix a strategic game G :=(S1, . . . ,Sn, p1, . . . , pn). We denote S1×·· ·×Sn by S, call each element s∈ S
a joint strategy, denote the ith element of s by si, and abbreviate the sequence (s j) j 6=i to s−i. Occasionally
we write (si,s−i) instead of s.
We call a strategy si of player i a best response to a joint strategy s−i of his opponents if ∀s′i ∈
Si pi(si,s−i)≥ pi(s′i,s−i). We call a joint strategy s a Nash equilibrium if each si is a best response to s−i.
Further, we call a strategy s′i of player i a better response given a joint strategy s if pi(s′i,s−i)> pi(si,s−i).
By a profitable deviation we mean a pair (s,s′) of joint strategies such that s′ = (s′i,s−i) for some s′i
and pi(s′)> pi(s). Following [10], an improvement path is a maximal sequence of profitable deviations.
Clearly, if an improvement path is finite, then its last element is a Nash equilibrium. A game is called
weakly acyclic (see [16, 9]) if for every joint strategy there exists a finite improvement path that starts at
it. In other words, in weakly acyclic games a Nash equilibrium can be reached from every initial joint
strategy by a sequence of unilateral deviations. Given two joint strategies s and s′ we write
• s > s′ if for all i, pi(s)> pi(s′).
When s > s′ holds we say that s′ is strictly worse than s.
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2.2 Social networks
We are interested in strategic games defined over a specific type of social networks introduced in [1] that
we recall first.
Let V = {1, . . . ,n} be a finite set of agents and G = (V,E,w) a weighted directed graph with wi j ∈
[0,1] being the weight of the edge (i, j). Given a node i of G, we denote by N(i) the set of nodes from
which there is an incoming edge to i. We call each j ∈ N(i) a neighbour of i in G. We assume that
for each node i such that N(i) 6= /0, ∑ j∈N(i) w ji ≤ 1. An agent i ∈ V is said to be a source node in G if
N(i) = /0. Given a (to be defined) network S we denote by source(S ) the set of source nodes in the
underlying graph G.
By a social network (from now on, just network) we mean a tuple S = (G,P,P,θ), where
• G is a weighted directed graph,
• P is a finite set of alternatives or products,
• P is function that assigns to each agent i a non-empty set of products P(i) from which it can make
a choice,
• θ is a threshold function that for each i ∈V and t ∈ P(i) yields a value θ(i, t) ∈ (0,1].
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Figure 1: A social network
Example 1. Figure 1 shows an example of a network. Let the threshold be 0.3 for all nodes. The set of
products P is {t1, t2, t3, t4}, the product set of each agent is marked next to the node denoting it and the
weights are labels on the edges. Each source node is represented by the unique product in its product set.
✷
Given two social networks S and S ′ we say that S ′ is an expansion of S if it results from adding
a product to the product set of a node in S . We say then also that S is a contraction of S ′.
2.3 Social network games
Next, introduce the strategic games over the social networks. They form a modification of the games
studied in [14, 15] in that we do not admit a strategy representing the fact that a player abstains from
choosing a product.
Fix a network S = (G,P,P,θ). With each network S we associate a strategic game G (S ). The
idea is that the agents simultaneously choose a product. Subsequently each node assesses his choice by
comparing it with the choices made by his neighbours. Formally, we define the game as follows:
• the players are the agents (i.e., the nodes),
• the set of strategies for player i is Si := P(i),
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• For i ∈V , t ∈ P(i) and a joint strategy s, let N ti (s) := { j ∈ N(i) | s j = t}, i.e., N ti (s) is the set of
neighbours of i who adopted in s the product t.
The payoff function is defined as follows, where c0 is some given in advance positive constant:
– for i ∈ source(S ),
pi(s) := c0,
– for i 6∈ source(S ),
pi(s) := ∑
j∈N ti (s)
w ji−θ(i, t) , where si = t and t ∈ P(i).
In the first case we assume that the payoff function for the source nodes is constant only for simplicity.
The second case of the payoff definition is motivated by the following considerations. When agent i is
not a source node, his ‘satisfaction’ from a joint strategy depends positively from the accumulated weight
(read: ‘influence’) of his neighbours who made the same choice as him, and negatively from his threshold
level (read: ‘resistance’) to adopt this product. The assumption that θ(i, t)> 0 reflects the view that there
is always some resistance to adopt a product.
We call these games social network games with obligatory product selection, in short, social net-
work games.
Example 2. Consider the network given in Example 1 and the joint strategy s where each source node
chooses the unique product in its product set and nodes 1, 2 and 3 choose t2, t3 and t2 respectively. The
payoffs are then given as follows:
• for the source nodes, the payoff is the fixed constant c0,
• p1(s) = 0.5−0.3 = 0.2,
• p2(s) = 0.4−0.3 = 0.1,
• p3(s) = 0.4−0.3 = 0.1.
Let s′ be the joint strategy in which player 3 chooses t3 and the remaining players make the same
choice as given in s. Then (s,s′) is a profitable deviation since p3(s′) > p3(s). In what follows, we
represent each profitable deviation by a node and a strategy it switches to, e.g., 3 : t3. Starting at s, the
sequence of profitable deviations 3 : t3,1 : t4 is an improvement path which results in the joint strategy
in which nodes 1, 2 and 3 choose t4, t3 and t3 respectively and, as before, each source node chooses the
unique product in its product set. ✷
By definition, the payoff of each player depends only on the strategies chosen by his neighbours, so
the social network games are related to graphical games of [8]. However, the underlying dependence
structure of a social network game is a directed graph. Further, note that these games satisfy the join the
crowd property that we define as follows:
Each payoff function pi depends only on the strategy chosen by player i and the set of players
who also chose his strategy. Moreover, the dependence on this set is monotonic.
The last qualification is exactly opposite to the definition of congestion games with player-specific
payoff functions of [9] in which the dependence on the above set is antimonotonic. That is, when more
players choose the strategy of player i, then his payoff weakly decreases.
3 Nash equilibria
The first natural question we address is whether the social network games have a Nash equilibrium.
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3.1 Simple cycles
In contrast to the case of games studied in [14] the answer is negative already for the case when the
underlying graph is a simple cycle.
Example 3. Consider the network given in Figure 2, where the product set of each agent is marked next
to the node denoting it and the weights are all equal and put as labels on the edges.
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Figure 2: A simple cycle no Nash equilibrium
Let the thresholds be defined as follows: θ(1, t1) = θ(2, t2) = θ(3, t3) = r1 and θ(1, t2) = θ(2, t3) =
θ(3, t1) = r2 where r1 > r2. We also assume that w > r1− r2. Hence for all s2 and s3
p1(t1,s2, t1)> p1(t2,s2,s3)> p1(t1,s2, t3)
and similarly for the payoff functions p2 and p3. So it is more profitable for player i to adopt strategy ti
provided its neighbour also adopts ti.
It is easy to check that the game associated with this network has no Nash equilibrium. Indeed, here
is the list of all the joint strategies, where we underline the strategy that is not a best response to the
choice of other players: (t1, t2, t1), (t1, t2, t3), (t1, t3, t1), (t1, t3, t3), (t2, t2, t1), (t2, t2, t3), (t2, t3, t1), (t2, t3, t3).
✷
This example can be easily generalized to the case of an arbitrary simple cycle. Below, i⊕1 and i⊖1
stand for addition and subtraction defined cyclically over the set {1, . . . ,n}. So n⊕1 = 1 and 1⊖1 = n.
Indeed, consider a social network with n nodes that form a simple cycle and assume that each player i
has strategies ti and ti⊕1. Choose for each player i the weights wi⊖1 i and the threshold function θ(i, t) so
that
wi⊖1 i−θ(i, ti)>−θ(i, ti⊕1)>−θ(i, ti),
so that (we put on first two positions, respectively, the strategies of players i⊖ 1 and i, while the last
argument is a joint strategy of the remaining n−2 players)
pi(ti, ti,s)> pi(t ′, ti⊕1,s′)> pi(ti⊖1, ti,s′′),
where t ′,s,s′ and s′′ are arbitrary. It is easy to check then that the resulting social network game has no
Nash equilibrium.
A natural question is what is the complexity of determining whether a Nash equilibrium exists. First
we consider this question for the special case when the underlying graph is a simple cycle.
Theorem 4. Consider a network S whose underlying graph is a simple cycle. It takes O(n · |P|4) time
to decide whether the game G (S ) has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose S = (G,P,P,θ). When the underlying graph of S is a simple cycle, the concept of a
best response of player i⊕1 to a strategy of player i is well-defined. Let
Ri := {(ti, ti⊕1) | ti ∈ P(i), ti⊕1 ∈ P(i⊕1), ti⊕1 is a best response to ti},
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I := {(t, t) | t ∈P},
and let ◦ stand for the composition of binary relations.
The question whether G (S ) has a Nash equilibrium is then equivalent to the problem whether there
exists a sequence a1, ...,an such that (a1,a2) ∈ R1, ...,(an−1,an) ∈ Rn−1,(an,a1) ∈ Rn. In other words, is
(R1 ◦ · · · ◦Rn)∩ I non-empty?
To answer this question we first construct successively n−1 compositions R1 ◦R2, (R1 ◦R2)◦R3, . . . ,
(. . . (R1 ◦R2) · · · ◦Rn−1)◦Rn.
Each composition construction can be carried out in |P|4 steps. Indeed, given two relations A,B⊆P×
P , to compute their composition A ◦B requires for each pair (a,b) ∈ A to find all pairs (c,d) ∈ B such
that b = c. Finally, to check whether the intersection of R1 ◦ · · · ◦Rn with I is non-empty requires at most
|P| steps.
So to answer the original question takes O(n · |P|4) time.
Note that this proof applies to any strategic game in which there is a reordering of players pi(1), . . . ,pi(n)
such that the payoff of player pi(i) depends only on his strategy and the strategy chosen by player pi(i⊖ i).
It is worthwhile to note that for the case of simple cycles, the existence of Nash equilibrium in the
associated social network game does not imply that the game is weakly acyclic.
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Figure 3: A simple cycle and an infinite improvement path
Example 5. Consider the network in Figure 3(a) which is a modification of the network in Figure 2.
We add a new product t4 to the product set of all the nodes i with θ(i, t4) > r1. We also assume that
w−θ(i, t4)>−r2. Then the joint strategy (t4, t4, t4) is a Nash equilibrium. However, Figure 3(b) shows
the unique improvement path starting in (t1, t3, t1) which is infinite. For each joint strategy in the figure,
we underline the strategy that is not a best response. This shows that the game is not weakly acyclic. ✷
In Section 4 we shall study the complexity of checking whether a social network game is weakly
acyclic.
3.2 Arbitrary social networks
In this section we establish two results which show that deciding whether a social network has a Nash
equilibrium is computationally hard.
Theorem 6. Deciding whether for a social network S the game G (S ) has a Nash equilibrium is NP-
complete.
To prove the result we first construct another example of a social network game with no Nash equi-
librium and then use it to determine the complexity of the existence of Nash equilibria.
Example 7. Consider the network given in Figure 4, where the product set of each agent is marked next
to the node denoting it and the weights are labels on the edges. Nodes with a unique product in the
product set is simply represented by the product.
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Figure 4: A network with no Nash equilibrium
We assume that each threshold is a constant θ , where θ < w1 < w2. So it is more profitable to a
player residing on a triangle to adopt the product adopted by his neighbour residing on a triangle than by
the other neighbour.
The game associated with this network has no Nash equilibrium. It suffices to analyze the joint
strategies involving nodes 1, 2 and 3 since the other nodes have exactly one product in their product
sets. Here we provide a listing of all such joint strategies, where we underline the strategy that is not a
best response to the choice of other players: (t1, t1, t2), (t1, t1, t3), (t1, t3, t2), (t1, t3, t3), (t2, t1, t2), (t2, t1, t3),
(t2, t3, t2), (t2, t3, t3). In contrast, what will be of relevance in a moment, if we replace {t1} by {t ′1}, then
the corresponding game has a Nash equilibrium, namely the joint strategy corresponding to the triple
(t2, t3, t3). ✷
Proof of Theorem 6: As in [1], to show NP-hardness, we use a reduction from the NP-complete PAR-
TITION problem, which is: given n positive rational numbers (a1, . . . ,an), is there a set S such that
∑i∈S ai = ∑i6∈S ai? Consider an instance I of PARTITION. Without loss of generality, suppose we have
normalised the numbers so that ∑ni=1 ai = 1. Then the problem instance sounds: is there a set S such that
∑i∈S ai = ∑i6∈S ai = 12 ?
To construct the appropriate network we employ the networks given in Figure 4 and in Figure 5,
where for each node i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} we set wia = wib = ai, and assume that the thresholds of the nodes a
and b are constant and equal 12 .
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Figure 5: A network related to the PARTITION problem
To finalize the construction we use two copies of the network given in Figure 4, one unchanged and
the other in which the product t1 is replaced everywhere by t ′1, and construct the desired network S by
identifying with the node marked by {t1} in the network from Figure 4, the node a of the network from
Figure 5 and with the node marked by {t ′1} in the modified version of the network from Figure 4 the node
b.
Suppose that a solution to the considered instance of the PARTITION problem exists, i.e., for some
set S ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} we have ∑i∈S ai = ∑i6∈S ai = 12 . Consider the game G (S ) and the joint strategy s
formed by the following strategies:
• t1 assigned to each node i ∈ S in the network from Figure 5,
• t ′1 assigned to each node i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}\S in the network from Figure 5,
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• t ′1 assigned to the nodes a and t1 to the node b,
• t2 assigned to node 1 and t3 assigned to the nodes 2, 3 in both versions of the networks from
Figure 4,
• t2 and t3 assigned respectively to the nodes marked by {t2} and {t3}.
We claim that s is a Nash equilibrium. Consider first the player (i.e., node) a. The accumulated
weight of its neighbours who chose strategy t ′1 is 12 . Therefore, the payoff for a in the joint strategy s is
0. The accumulated weight of its neighbours who chose strategy t1 is 12 , as well. Therefore t
′
1 is indeed
a best response for player a as both strategies yield the same payoff. For the same reason, t1 is a best
response for player b. The analysis for the other nodes is straightforward.
Conversely, suppose that a strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium in G (S ). From Example 7 it
follows that sa = t ′1 and sb = t1. This implies that t ′1 is a best response of node a to s−a and therefore
∑i∈{1,...,n}|si=t ′1 wia ≥ ∑i∈{1,...,n}|si=t1 wia. By a similar reasoning, for node b we have ∑i∈{1,...,n}|si=t1 wib ≥
∑i∈{1,...,n}|si=t ′1 wib. Since ∑ni=1 ai = 1 and for i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, wia = wib = ai, and si ∈ {t1, t ′1} we have for
S := {i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} | si = t1}, ∑i∈S ai = ∑i6∈S ai. In other words, there exists a solution to the considered
instance of the partition problem. ✷
Theorem 8. For a network S whose underlying graph has no source nodes, deciding whether the game
G (S ) has a Nash equilibrium is NP-complete.
Proof. The proof extends the proof of the above theorem. Given an instance of the PARTITION problem
we use the following modification of the network. We ‘twin’ each node i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} in Figure 5 with a
new node i′ with the product set {t1, t ′1}, by adding the edges (i, i′) and (i′, i). We also ‘twin’ nodes marked
{t2} and {t3} in Figure 4 with new nodes with the product set {t2} and {t3} respectively. Additionally,
we choose the weights on the new edges wii′ , wi′i and the corresponding thresholds so that when i and
i′ adopt a common product, their payoff is positive. Then the underlying graph of the resulting network
does not have any source nodes and the above proof remains valid for this new network.
4 Weakly acyclic games
In this section we study the complexity of checking whether a social network game is weakly acyclic.
We establish two results that are analogous to the ones established in [15] for the case of social networks
in which the nodes may decide not to choose any product. The proofs are based on similar arguments
though the details are different.
Theorem 9. For an arbitrary network S , deciding whether the game G (S ) is weakly acyclic is co-NP
hard.
Proof. We again use an instance of the PARTITION problem in the form of n positive rational numbers
(a1, . . .,an) such that ∑ni=1 ai = 1. Consider the network given in Figure 6. For each node i ∈ {1, . . .,n}
we set P(i) = {t1, t2}. The product set for the other nodes are marked in the figure. As before, we set
wia = wib = ai.
Since for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, ai is rational, it has the form ai = liri . Let τ =
1
2·r1·...·rn . The following
property holds.
Property 1. Given an instance (a1, . . . ,an) of the PARTITION problem and τ defined as above, for all
S ⊆ {1, . . . ,n}
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Figure 6: A network related to weakly acyclic games
(i) if ∑i∈S ai < 12 , then ∑i∈S ai ≤ 12 − τ ,
(ii) if ∑i∈S ai > 12 , then ∑i∈S ai ≥ 12 + τ .
Proof. By definition, each ai and 12 is a multiple of τ . Thus ∑i∈S ai = x ·τ and 12 = y ·τ where x and y are
integers.
(i) If x · τ < y · τ , then x · τ ≤ (y−1) · τ . Therefore ∑i∈S ai ≤ 12 − τ .
The proof of (ii) is analogous.
Note that given (a1, . . . ,an), τ can be defined in polynomial time. Let the thresholds be defined as
follows: θ(a, t1) = θ(b, t2) = 12 and 0 < θ(a, t4) = θ(b, t5) < τ . The threshold for nodes c,d and e is a
constant θ1 such that θ1 < w1 < w2. Thus, like in the network in Figure 4, it is more profitable to a player
residing on a triangle to adopt the product adopted by his neighbour residing on a triangle than by the
other neighbour.
Suppose that a solution to the considered instance of the PARTITION problem exists. That is, for
some set S⊆{1, . . .,n}we have ∑i∈S ai = ∑i6∈S ai = 12 . In the game G (S ), take the joint strategy s formed
by the following strategies:
• t1 assigned to each node i ∈ S and the nodes a and c,
• t2 assigned to each node i ∈ {1, . . .,n}\S and the nodes b and d,
• t3 assigned to the nodes e and g.
Any improvement path that starts in this joint strategy will not change the strategies assigned to the
nodes a,b and g. So if such an improvement path terminates, it produces a Nash equilibrium in the game
associated with the network given in Figure 4 of Example 7. But we argued that this game does not have
a Nash equilibrium. Consequently, there is no finite improvement path in the game G (S ) that starts in
the above joint strategy and therefore G (S ) is not weakly acyclic.
Now suppose that the considered instance of the PARTITION problem does not have a solution.
Then we show that the game G (S ) is weakly acyclic. To this end, we order the nodes of S as follows
(note the positions of the nodes c,d and e): 1,2, . . .,n,g,a,b,c,e,d. Given a joint strategy, consider an
improvement path in which at each step the first node in the above list that did not select a best response
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switches to a best response. After at most n steps the nodes 1,2, . . .,n all selected a product t1 or t2. Let
s be the resulting joint strategy.
First suppose that ∑i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t1 wia > 12 . This implies that ∑i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t2 wib < 12 . By Property 1,
∑i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t2 wib ≤ 12 − τ . The payoff of the node b depends only on the choices made by the source
nodes 1,2, . . . ,n, so we have pb(t2,s−b) ≤ −τ . Since θ(b, t5) < τ , we also have pb(t5,s−b) > −τ and
therefore t5 is a best response for node b. Let sb be the resulting strategy in which node b selects t5.
Consider the prefix of ξ starting at sb (call it ξ b). We argue that in ξ b, t2 is never a better response for
node d. Suppose that sbd = t3. We have the following two cases:
• sbe = t3: then pd(sb) = w2−θ1 and so t3 is the best response for node d.
• sbe = t1: then pd(sb) = −θ1 and if node d switches to t2 then pd(t2,sb−b) = −θ1 (since sbb = t5).
Thus t2 is not a better response.
Using the above observation, we conclude that there exists a suffix of ξ b (call it ξ d) such that node d
never chooses t2. This means that in ξ d the unique best response for node c is t1 and for node e is t1. This
shows that ξ d is finite and hence ξ is finite, as well.
The case when ∑i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t2 wib > 12 is analogous with all improvement paths terminating in a joint
strategy where node a chooses t4 and node c chooses t2.
Theorem 10. For a network S whose underlying graph has no source nodes, deciding whether the
game G (S ) is weakly acyclic is co-NP hard.
Proof. The proof extends the proof of the above theorem. Given an instance of the PARTITION problem
we use the following modification of the network given in Figure 6. We ‘twin’ each node i ∈ {1, . . .,n}
with a new node i′, also with the product set {t1, t2}, by adding the edges (i, i′) and (i′, i). We also ‘twin’
the node g with a new node g′, also with the product set {t3}, by adding the edges (g,g′) and (g′,g).
Additionally, we choose the weights wii′ and wi′i and the corresponding thresholds so that when i and i′
adopt a common product, their payoff is positive.
Suppose that a solution to the considered instance of the PARTITION problem exists. Then we
extend the joint strategy considered in the proof of Theorem 9 by additionally assigning t1 to each node
i′ such that i ∈ S, t2 to each node i′ such that i ∈ {1, . . .,n}\S and t3 to the node g′. Then, as before, there
is no finite improvement path starting in this joint strategy, so G (S ) is not weakly acyclic.
Suppose now that no solution to the considered instance of the PARTITION problem exists. Take the
following order of the nodes of S :
1,1′,2,2′, . . .,n,n′,g,g′,a,b,c,e,d,
and as in the previous proof, given a joint strategy, we consider an improvement path ξ in which at each
step the first node in the above list that did not select a best response switches to a best response.
Note that each node from the list 1,1′,2,2′, . . .,n,n′,g,g′ is scheduled at most once. So there exists a
suffix of ξ in which only the nodes a,b,c,e,d are scheduled. Using now the argument given in the proof
of Theorem 9 we conclude that there exists a suffix of ξ that is finite. This proves that G (S ) is weakly
acyclic.
5 Paradoxes
In [2] we identified various paradoxes in social networks with multiple products and studied them using
the social network games introduced in [14]. Here we carry out an analogous analysis for the case when
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the product selection is obligatory. This qualification, just like in the case of social network games,
substantially changes the analysis. We focus on the main four paradoxes that we successively introduce
and analyze.
5.1 Vulnerable networks
The first one is the following. We say that a social network S is vulnerable if for some Nash equilibrium
s in G (S ), an expansion S ′ of S exists such that each improvement path in G (S ′) leads from s to
a joint strategy s′ which is a Nash equilibrium both in G (S ′) and G (S ) such that s > s′. So the
newly added product triggers a sequence of changes that unavoidably move the players from one Nash
equilibrium to another one that is strictly worse for everybody.
The following example shows that vulnerable networks exist. Here and elsewhere the relevant ex-
pansion is depicted by means of a product and the dotted arrow pointing to the relevant node.
Example 11. Consider the directed graph given in Figure 7, in which the product set of each node is
marked next to it.
1
{t1,t3,t4}

**
2jj
{t1,t4}
t2oo
3
{t2,t3} **
4jj
{t2,t3}
OO
Figure 7: A directed graph
We complete it to the desired social network below. Let ‘_’ stand for an arbitrary strategy of the
relevant player. We stipulate that
p2(_, t2,_, t2)> p2(t1, t1,_,_),
p1(t3, t2,_,_)> p1(t1, t2,_,_)> p1(t4, t2,_,_),
p3(t3,_, t3,_)> p3(_,_, t2, t2),
p4(_,_, t3, t3)> p4(_,_, t3, t2),
p2(_, t4,_,_)> p2(_, t2,_, t3),
p1(t4, t4,_,_)> p1(t3,_,_,_)> p1(t1, t4,_,_),
so that 2 : t2,1 : t3,3 : t3,4 : t3,2 : t4,1 : t4 is a unique improvement path that starts in (t1, t1, t2, t2) and ends
in (t4, t4, t3, t3).
Additionally we stipulate that
p1(t1, t1,_,_)> p1(t4, t4,_,_),
p2(t1, t1,_,_)> p2(t4, t4,_,_),
p3(_,_, t2, t2)> p3(_,_, t3, t3),
p4(_,_, t2, t2)> p4(_,_, t3, t3),
so that (t1, t1, t2, t2)>s (t4, t4, t3, t3).
These requirements entail constraints on the weights and thresholds that are for instance realized by
w12 = 0, w21 = 0.2, w42 = 0.3, w13 = 0.2, w34 = 0.2, w43 = 0,
and
θ(1, t1) = 0.2, θ(1, t3) = 0.1, θ(1, t4) = 0.3, θ(2, t1) = 0.1, θ(2, t2) = 0.3,
θ(2, t4) = 0.2, θ(3, t2) = 0.1, θ(3, t3) = 0.2, θ(4, t2) = 0.1, θ(4, t3) = 0.2. ✷
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It is useful to note that in the setup of [2], in which for each player the ‘abstain’ strategy is allowed, it
remains an open problem whether vulnerable networks (called there because of various other alternatives
∀s-vulnerable networks) exist.
5.2 Fragile networks
Next, we consider the following notion. We say that a social network S is fragile if G (S ) has a Nash
equilibrium while for some expansion S ′ of S , G (S ′) does not. The following example shows that
fragile networks exist.
Example 12. Consider the network S given in Figure 8, where the product set of each node is marked
next to it.
1
w
❃
❃❃
❃❃
❃❃
❃❃
{t2} t1oo❴ ❴ ❴ ❴
3
w
@@✁✁✁✁✁✁✁✁✁{t3,t1}
2
w
oo
{t2,t3}
Figure 8: A fragile network
Let the thresholds be defined as follows: θ(2, t2)= θ(3, t3)= r1 and θ(1, t2) = θ(2, t3)= θ(3, t1)= r2
where r1 > r2. We also assume that w > r1− r2.
Consider the joint strategy s, in which nodes 1, 2 and 3 choose t2, t2 and t1 respectively. It can be
verified that s is a Nash equilibrium in G (S ). Now consider the expansion S ′ of S in which product t1
is added to the product set of node 1 and let θ(1, t1) = r1. Then S ′ is the network in Example 3 which,
as we saw, does not have a Nash equilibrium. ✷
5.3 Inefficient networks
We say that a social network S is inefficient if for some Nash equilibrium s in G (S ), a contraction S ′
of S exists such that each improvement path in G (S ′) starting in s leads to a joint strategy s′ which is
a Nash equilibrium both in G (S ′) and G (S ) such that s′ > s. We note here that if the contraction was
created by removing a product from the product set of node i, we impose that any improvement path in
G (S ′), given a starting joint strategy from G (S ), begins by having node i making a choice (we allow
any choice from his remaining set of products as an improvement move). Otherwise the initial payoff of
node i in G (S ′) is not well-defined.
Example 13. We exhibit in Figure 9 an example of an inefficient network. The weight of each edge is
assumed to be w, and we also have the same product-independent threshold, θ , for all nodes, with w > θ .
Consider as the initial Nash equilibrium the joint strategy s = (t2, t2, t1, t1). It is easy to check that this
is indeed a Nash equilibrium, with the payoff equal to w−θ for all nodes. Suppose now that we remove
product t1 from the product set of node 3. We claim that the unique improvement path then leads to the
Nash equilibrium in which all nodes adopt t2.
To see this, note that node 3 moves first in any improvement path and it has a unique choice, t2. Then
node 4 moves and necessarily switches to t2. This yields a Nash equilibrium in which each node selected
t2 with the payoff of 2w−θ , which is strictly better than the payoff in s. ✷
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Figure 9: An example of an inefficient network
5.4 Unsafe networks
Finally, we analyze the following notion. We call a social network S unsafe if G (S ) has a Nash
equilibrium, while for some contraction S ′ of S , G (S ′) does not. The following example shows that
unsafe networks exist.
Example 14. Let S1 be the modification of the network S given in Figure 2 where node 1 has the
product set {t1, t2, t4}, where θ(1, t4) < r2. Then the joint strategy (t4, t3, t3) is a Nash equilibrium in
G (S1). Now consider the contraction S ′1 of S1 where product t4 is removed from node 1. Then S ′1 is
the network S , which as we saw in Example 3 has no Nash equilibrium. ✷
6 Conclusions
In this paper we studied dynamic aspects of social networks with multiple products using the basic
concepts of game theory. We used the model of social networks, originally introduced in [1] that we
subsequently studied using game theory in [14], [15] and [2].
However, in contrast to these three references the product adoption in this paper is obligatory. This
led to some differences. For example, in contrast to the case of [14], a Nash equilibrium does not need
to exist when the underlying graph is a simple cycle. Further, in contrast to the setup of [2], we were
able to construct a social network that exhibits the strongest form of the paradox of choice. On the other
hand, some complexity results, namely the ones concerning weakly acyclic games, remain the same as
in [14], though the proofs had to be appropriately modified.
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